Lord Callanan: My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate.
Amendment 6, in the names of my noble friend Lady McIntosh and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, seeks to clarify the meaning of Clause 5(3). This subsection explains that
“A relevant requirement … is of no effect in the destination part if, and to the extent that, it directly or indirectly discriminates against the incoming goods.”
This wording was chosen by the Government because it targets discrimination, while leaving intact other elements of a regulation that may be perfectly useful or serviceable. For example, consider the case of one requirement covering two products. One of those products is not discriminated against, but the other faces indirect discrimination due to the particular market structure for that product. Clause 5 ensures that the regulation of the product which is not facing discrimination continues. This would not be the case if the requirement were struck down in its entirety when any part of it is discriminatory.
This amendment gives rise to a risk that a court would read this as attempting to oust its jurisdiction on normal grounds of challenge. That is clearly not the intention of this provision, which is to target the mischief of discrimination without going further or interfering with other legislation. I am sure that it goes without saying that we would not want to invoke any such confusion, nor do I think that that is what my noble friend and the noble Lord are trying to achieve. For these reasons, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
On Amendment 24, from the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, and others, I am very happy to accept a letter from the noble Baroness, and I will ensure that it gets a full reply. The Government are fully committed to Article 2 of the protocol—that goes without saying. We have demonstrated this by making the necessary amendments to the Northern Ireland Act to establish the dedicated mechanism and by working closely with the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland to operationalise the dedicated mechanism, ready for the end of the transition period.
The Article 2 commitment is about protecting the specific rights that individuals are afforded under the Belfast/Good Friday agreement and non-discrimination in this regard. It is supported by six EU equality directives that are all designed to tackle discrimination because of specified protected characteristics of individuals and to promote equal treatment. It will be part of the role of both commissions, through the dedicated mechanism structure, to monitor, advise, report on and enforce the Article 2 commitment and report to the Government and the Executive Office in Northern Ireland in this regard.
As I have said, we have already delivered the relevant legislative measures to give effect to Article 2 of the protocol, and no further amendments are required in this regard. I can assure noble Lords that the rights for individuals in Northern Ireland captured within the scope of the Article 2 commitment will continue to be protected going forward and will not be impacted by the outworkings of this Bill.
In reply to the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, I can say that, for statutory requirements to be relevant requirements under Clause 6, they must be requirements that apply to, or in relation to, goods sold in the nation in question. If the employment law requirement were to meet that test, they would not be disapplied because they had discriminatory effects.
I hope that, with those assurances, that the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, will not press Amendment 24.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe: My Lords, I speak to this group of amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, applying a super-affirmative resolution procedure to changes to the reach of Clause 8 on indirect discrimination on services, the goods, equivalence and various other clauses having fallen. Amendment 9 requires publication of the results of consultation and reasons for decisions reached, and Amendment 74 tries to overcome the Minister’s objection to the super-affirmative procedure on the grounds that it could cause needless delay by providing for rapid approval in cases of urgency.
I agree with the need for consultation and explanation, but I am not sure that this needs to be in the Bill. There would indeed be an opt-out in cases of urgency, but only if this route were to find favour with our House. However, I do not believe that the case has been made that the super-affirmative procedure is needed, certainly not on the scale proposed and in the light of the amendments already made by the Government in respect of mutual recognition and goods.
I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, said about the Minister’s readiness to listen to the experts in this House and to make changes to make this  legislation work. I was involved in securing the procedures used very selectively in the withdrawal Act, when the then Minister, my noble friend Lord Callanan, was very helpful. I am a practical person, and I have not seen any real evidence here of the need for the use of the super-affirmative procedure. We need much more specific, concrete concerns to justify my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering’s amendment. If the proposers of the amendment are just fearful, that is not enough to merit the super-affirmative procedure.
Perhaps the Minister can provide examples of how the powers in the clauses will be used and, perhaps more important, why he believes that the super-affirmative procedure is over the top in this case. That would sit on the record, Pepper v Hart style, and minimise the risk from the use of the powers in the Bill.